Collective Decisions and Voting

Contents: Preface; Part 1 Collective Decisions: Defining a collective decision; A taxonomy of collective decision procedures; Economic criteria for evaluating collective decisions; General criteria for evaluating collective decision procedures; Relative advantages of modes of making collective decisions; What is a good collective decision?. Part 2 Voting: An overview of voting; Majority rule and its weighted analog; Voting cycles; The Arrow Theorem; Strategic voting and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem; Criteria for evaluating ranking-based vote-processing rules; Vote processing rules for selecting one option from many when votes have predetermined weights: alternatives to plurality; Vote processing rules for selecting one option from a continuum of one or more dimensions when votes have predetermined weights; Vote processing rules for selecting more than one candidate when votes have predetermined weights: proportional representation; Vote processing rules with endogenous weights for self-interested advocates: revealing intensities of preferences; Lessons from the excursion; Bibliography; Index.

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• Psicologia social, de grupo ou colectiva
• Economia política
• Administração pública

Collective Decision Procedure;procedure;Collective Decisions;gibbard;Paired Comparison;satterthwaite;Gibbard Satterthwaite Theorem;theorem;Arrow Theorem;self-interested;Self-interested Advocates;advocates;Universal Domain;universal;Maximin Rule;domain;Disinterested Judges;arrow;Smith Set;disinterested;Bergson Samuelson Social Welfare Function;Single Peaked Preferences;Strategic Voting;Majority Rule Equilibrium;Social Welfare Function;Majority Consistency;Pareto Improvement;Winning Option;Material Equality;Symbolic Equality;Clarke Taxes;Procedural Efficiency;Cumulative Voting;Voting Procedure;Arrow's Work