Institutional Design and Voting Power in the European Union

Institutional Design and Voting Power in the European Union

Zyczkowski, Karol; Cichocki, Marek A.

Taylor & Francis Ltd

10/2010

322

Dura

Inglês

9780754677543

15 a 20 dias

760

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Introduction; I: Voting System for the Council of European Union; 1: Is the Double Majority Really Double? The Voting Rules in the Lisbon Treaty 1; 2: Penrose's Square-Root Rule and the EU Council of Ministers; 3: Jagiellonian Compromise - An Alternative Voting System for the Council of the European Union; 4: The Double Majority Voting Rule of the EU Reform Treaty as a Democratic Ideal for an Enlarging Union; 5: The Blocking Power in Voting Systems; 6: The Distribution of Power in the Council of Ministers of the European Union; II: Distribution of Power in the European Union; 7: The Distribution of Power in the European Cluster Game; 8: The Constitutional Power of Voters in the European Parliament; 9: Decision Rules and Intergovernmentalism in the European Union; 10: On the Relative Unimportance of Voting Weights; 11: Patterns of Voting in the Council of Ministers of the European Union; 12: Decision-Making in the EU Council after the First Eastern Enlargement; III: Allocation of Seats in the European Parliament; 13: Degressive Proportionality; 14: Putting Citizens First; 15: Comparative Analysis of Several Methods for Determining the Composition of the European Parliament; 16: On Bounds for Allocation of Seats in the European Parliament; 17: Conclusions
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